Under English law, injunctions in employment contracts are enforceable if: [citation required] (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), the list of clients, including the names, addresses and identities of all employer clients who have registered work orders with an employment agency within 180 days prior to the separation of an employee from the agency and which contains the names, addresses and identities of all applicant clients of the Employment Agency represents a trade secret and confidential information of the Employment Agency and belongs to it. The doctrine of trade restriction is based on the two concepts of prohibition of agreements contrary to public policy, unless the appropriateness of an agreement can be demonstrated. A trade restriction is simply an agreed type of provision to restrict someone else`s trade. For example, Nordenfelt promised against Maxim, Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co[2], a Swedish weapons inventor when selling his business to an American arms manufacturer, that he “would not manufacture weapons or ammunition anywhere in the world and would not compete with Maxim in any way.” Although the doctrine of trade restriction is still in force, its current use in most countries has been limited by modern and economic competition law laws. It remains of considerable importance in the United States, as is the case in Mitchel v. Reynolds. The 1911 Supreme Court decision in Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v. United States[14] was based on Taft`s analysis of the rule of reason. In this case, the court found that a contract violates the Sherman Act only if the contract “unreasonably” restricts trade, that is, if the contract has monopolistic consequences. A broader meaning, according to the Court, would prohibit normal and customary treaties and thus violate freedom of contract.

The Court thus upheld the rule of reason set out in Addyston Pipe, supra, which in turn flowed from Mitchel v. Reynolds and the Common Law of Restraints of Trade. Trade restriction in England and the United Kingdom was and is defined as a constitutional contract between a buyer and seller of a company or between an employer and an employee that prevents the seller or employee from carrying out a similar activity in a certain geographical area and within a certain period of time. [Citation needed] It is intended to protect protected trade secrets or information, but it is enforceable only if it is appropriate for the party against whom it is directed and if it is not contrary to public policy. At the most basic level, “trade restriction” is any activity that prevents another party from doing business, as it normally would without such a restriction. For example, two companies that agree to set prices to force another competitor to cease operations constitute an illegal trade restriction. Other examples include creating a monopoly, forcing another party to stop competing with your business, or illegal interference with a business (see Unauthorized Interference). However, not all trade restrictions are illegal, including non-compete obligations with workers in states where such agreements are enforceable if they deem it appropriate. In other cases, the question was raised as to whether the restriction was necessary and complementary in order to obtain only something undignified in view of the resulting harm. In a recent case, a court rejected an attempt by a credit card issuer to justify a restriction on competitive businesses deemed reasonably necessary to promote “loyalty” and “cohesion.” [17] How necessary and necessary for what remains such controversial issues under the teaching of Mitchel v. Reynolds. A contractual obligation not to trade is void against the donor and unenforceable because it is contrary to public policy of commercial promotion, unless the restriction of trade is appropriate to protect the interests of the buyer of a business.

[2] Trade restrictions may also occur in restrictive agreements subsequent to the termination of employment contracts. This was followed by Broad v Jolyffe[5] and Mitchel v Reynolds[6], where Lord Macclesfield asked: “What does it mean for a trader in London what another does in Newcastle?” At a time when communication and trade are so slow throughout the country, it seemed obvious that a general restriction served no legitimate purpose for one`s own business and should be null and void. But as early as 1880 Lord Justice Fry stated in Roussillon v. Roussillon[7] that an unlimited restriction in space need not be null and void, since the real question was whether it went beyond what was necessary to protect the promisor. For example, Lord Macnaghten ruled in the Nordenfelt case[2] that while one could legitimately promise “not to produce weapons or ammunition anywhere in the world”, it was an unreasonable restriction “not to compete in any way with Maxim”. This approach in England was confirmed by the House of Lords in Mason v The Provident Supply and Clothing Co. [8] Trade restriction is not a crime in itself, but a legal doctrine (based on common law) that refers to a relatively wide and fluid range of offences […].